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I. INTRODUCTION - JANE CAMPBELL MORIARTY**
Good morning and on behalf of Dean Ken Gormley and the fac-
ulty, I would like to welcome you to Duquesne University School of
Law. We are so pleased you are able to join us for this conference
commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Violence Against
Women Act.' This conference is one of many events being held
* Vice President and Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. This essay consists of
two addresses delivered at a Continuing Legal Education program held at the Duquesne
University School of Law on March 29, 2014. The program, entitled, The Violence Against
Women Act and Its Impact on the U.S. Supreme Court and International Law, marked the
twentieth anniversary of the Act. Dean Jane Campbell Moriarty of Duquesne University
School of Law introduced Professor Hanna as the keynote speaker.
** Carol Los Mansmann Chair of Faculty Scholarship, Associate Dean for Faculty
Scholarship, and Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law.
1. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. §§ 13925-14045d (2012).
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across the state at every law school in Pennsylvania in conjunction
with the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence.
The data about violence against women is disturbing and in-
deed, shocking. Every two minutes in America, someone is sexual-
ly assaulted.2 Department of Justice statistics indicate that in
2012, more than 345,000 people suffered a rape or sexual assault,
while over 1.3 million were the victims of domestic violence.3 In
Pennsylvania alone in 2013, approximately fifty women were
killed by their intimate partners. The effects of violence on wom-
en and families are often insurmountable: many suffer lifelong
damage in the form of chronic pain, depression, anxiety, drug and
alcohol abuse; the rate of drug and alcohol abuse is many, many
times the number of those who have not been abused. And the
U.S. is not the most dangerous place for women; in other parts of
the world, the numbers are far higher and the access to justice is
far less. Yet many people are working at home and abroad to re-
duce the rate of violence against women, including Cheryl Hanna,
our keynote speaker, who I am so pleased to introduce.
Cheryl Hanna is the Vice President of Enrollment Management,
External Relations, and Communication and Professor of Law at
Vermont Law School. She received her undergraduate degree
from Kalamazoo and her J.D. from Harvard. She is the author of
several articles relating to violence against women and girls and is
the author of a widely used casebook entitled Domestic Violence
and the Law.'
I have been reading Professor Hanna's work since 1998 when I
came across an article called The Paradox of Hope: Crime and
Punishment of Domestic Violence.' It was my favorite article at
the time. It was the first article I selected for a book I had just
2. See How Often Does Sexual Assault Occur, RAPE ABUSE & INCEST NATIONAL
NETWORK, http://www.rainn.org/get-information/statistics/frequency-of-sexual-assault (last
visited May 14, 2014).
3. Jennifer Truman, Lynn Langton, & Michael Planty, Criminal Victimization, 2012,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE 2 (Oct. 2013), http//www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvl2.pdf.
4. See 2013 Domestic Violence Fatalities in Pennsylvania,
PENNSYLVANIA COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
http://pubs.pcadv.net/websitePlanning/WEBTOEDITILEARN%20MORE/FatalityReport
2013.pdf (last visited May 14, 2014).
5. Domestic Violence and Substance Abuse, NATIONAL COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE, http://www.ncadv.org/files/SubstanceAbuse.pdf (last visited May 14, 2014).
6. ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, CHERYL HANNA, EMILY J. SACK & JUDITH G,
GREENBERG, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE (3d ed. 2012).
7. Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: Crime and Punishment of Domestic Violence,
39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1505 (1998).
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begun editing called Women and the Law,' and it set the standard
for all the other articles I included in the next decade. It's a fabu-
lous piece of work by a wonderful scholar. Professor Hanna is
speaking about violence against women and its impact on the U.S.
Supreme Court and international law. It is a story of vindication,
loss, and the human rights paradigm. Please join me in welcom-
ing our keynote speaker, Vice President and Professor of Law,
Cheryl Hanna.
II. KEYNOTE SPEECH - CHERYL HANNA, PROFESSOR OF LAW, VICE
PRESIDENT, VERMONT LAW SCHOOL
A. Introduction
Thank you very much for having me. I'm delighted to be here. I
am so appreciative of Jane for having me here. I can't believe it's
been twenty years since the Violence Against Women Act passed,
and I'm very grateful and humble to have been able to spend so
much of my career working on issues of gendered violence. De-
spite all the work that's left undone, I think we should take a mo-
ment to pause and really be grateful for all the progress that's
been made.
What I'd love to do is share with you a little bit of the history of
litigation around domestic violence, particularly at the United
States Supreme Court and in the international law to get up to
the 50,000-foot view of what's happening and where I think we
have yet to go. My work, as well as my work in gender and do-
mestic violence, is as a constitutional scholar, so I am going to try
to bring those two perspectives together.
I thought it would be good to start by reflecting back on the Vio-
lence Against Women Act, which, of course, passed in 1994. And I
came across this quote from Senator Joe Biden, now Vice Presi-
dent Biden, who said:
Through this process I have become convinced that violence
against women reflects as much a failure of our nation's col-
lective moral imagination as it does the failure of our nation's
laws and regulations. We are helpless to change the course of
8. WOMEN AND THE LAW (Jane Campbell Moriarty ed., 2009).
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this violence unless and until we achieve a national consensus
that deserves our public outrage.'
So we can ask ourselves as we go forward, how can we achieve
that goal? How do we create the kind of regulatory scheme and
laws, as well as the public outrage, against violence against wom-
en and girls?
Since the Violence Against Women Act passed-and even before
the act passed, but certainly since-at least before the Supreme
Court (so again, at that 50,000-foot level), we have seen a signifi-
cant number of cases involving violence against women: either
cases that directly implicate questions of the Violence Against
Women Act or related statutes, or cases involving violence against
women more generally. If you look at the Supreme Court's docket,
perhaps with the exception of federal preemption, there has prob-
ably been no greater growth area in the Court than cases involv-
ing gendered violence. This term alone, the Court has three cases
before it involving the Violence Against Women Act or domestic
violence. One, United States v. Castleman,"o just came down on
Wednesday; the Supreme Court ruled that a state conviction for
"misdemeanor domestic assault" qualifies as a "misdemeanor
crime of domestic violence" under federal law, thereby prohibiting
the defendant from having a gun.
When we think about domestic violence, we think, "Well, this is
really an issue that's happening in the local and state level. These
are small cases." But the issue is not about small cases. It's about
big cases. We've seen these cases since the Violence Against
Women Act began to trickle up to the Court. The question I want
to contemplate is a particular one, however. And that question is,
to what extent should the State-the government, "We the Peo-
ple"-bear responsibility for and the burden of alleviating violence
against women and girls? That's a very important and particular
question, because historically when we think about violence
against women and girls, we often think of it as a private family
matter that should be resolved between the parties. It's historical-
ly been thought of as something that happens within the privacy
9. MAJORITY STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 103D CONG., THE RESPONSE TO




10. 134 S. Ct. 1405 (2014).
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of home or in the privacy of the family. The fundamental question
that we have to wrestle with, both from the perspective of law and
policy but also from a broader perspective of human rights, is:
"What is the role of the state?" When I look back over the last
twenty years, I want to ask that question with two different ideas:
one, an idea of vindication, and one, an idea of loss.
B. Vindication
Vindication. What does it mean to be vindicated? To be vindi-
cated means not to be blamed; to not bear responsibility that was
not yours in the first place. Vindication means that you are not
the one who is at fault. When we think about violence against
women as not just an intimate family problem or something that's
personally related, but when we think of it as part of the status of
women and girls in the United States, I always like to go back to
the Declaration of Sentiments" and the first Women's Rights
Convention at Seneca Falls in 1848.
For those who may or may not know, the Declaration of Senti-
ments was one of the first declarations about what women's
rights-and human rights-in the world and the United States
ought to be. This is Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott.
One of the sentiments expressed at the Seneca Falls was to have
women vindicated.
It says he has made her morally an irresponsible being; that
she can commit any crime with impunity provided that it be
done in the presence of her husband. In the covenant of mar-
riage, she is compelled to promise obedience to her husband,
with him becoming for all intents and purposes her master,
and the law giving him the power to deprive her of liberty and
to administer chastisement.12
When we think all the way back, when we think to violence
against women emanating from the relationship of husband and
wife-and the justification for non-state intervention was that
men had to control their wives and that she could be chastised
because of her behavior. She was blamed. The first women's
rights convention demanded she be vindicated.
11. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Women's Rights Activist, Presentation to the Seneca Falls





That's vindication. Let me talk about loss. Loss is the experi-
ence of having something taken from you or something destroyed.
I don't use the term "loss" as in winning and losing, like in a court
case. "Loss": something that is actually taken from you, some-
thing about your personage that is no longer your own. Whenever
I think about loss and the law, I have to think about Myra
Bradwell, who was the first woman who was actually admitted
into the practice of law in the United States. Myra Bradwell's
husband was an attorney, and she studied for the bar under him.
At that time, you didn't have to go to law school. You could read
for the bar, and she had spent many years helping her husband.
She wanted to take the Illinois Bar exam, but the State of Illinois
said that only men could be lawyers. Ultimately, her case went all
the way up to the United States Supreme Court, and the Court
upheld the Illinois ban, although eventually Illinois did allow her
to become a lawyer. But when her case went to the Supreme
Court, it refused to vindicate her, but instead imposed a loss. In a
concurring opinion by Justice Bradley, he wrote, "The natural and
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evi-
dently unfits it for the many occupations of civil life. The para-
mount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil [sic] the noble
and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Crea-
tor."
So again, when we think about vindication and loss in the con-
text of gender violence and then gender discrimination, we have to
think about not just that Myra Bradwell lost her case, but that
she lost the right to full citizenship. She lost the right to pursue
one's own occupation, to pursue one's own passion. I also am al-
ways struck about the tenacity of somebody to bring their case all
the way to the United States Supreme Court and then lose-and I
think that all women, particularly those who are attorneys, should
reach back and thank Myra Bradwell for sticking to it and ulti-
mately becoming the first woman to pave the way for the rest of
us.
Let me tell you a couple of stories of both loss and vindication at
the United States Supreme Court, and then some ultimate stories
of vindication in the human rights context. In order to tell you
13. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring in the judg-
ment).
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these stories, I need to start a little bit before the Violence Against
Women Act was passed.
D. Joshua DeShaney: Loss
This is a story about Joshua DeShaney, a four-year old boy.
Joshua's parents were divorced, and custody was awarded to his
father in Winnebago, Wisconsin. There had been numerous alle-
gations and documentation of child abuse of Joshua by his father.
Joshua had been hospitalized. For a very short period of time he
was in state custody, but he was returned to his father under state
supervision. So his father was under state supervision, but Josh-
ua was living with his father. And I could go through all the facts
that would lead you to say you couldn't possibly believe that the
State of Wisconsin and that County of Winnebago did nothing to
protect Joshua, but let me just say that they did nothing to protect
Joshua, even after having serious, serious evidence of ongoing
child abuse.
One day, Joshua's father beat Joshua so badly that Joshua end-
ed up severely disabled and was confined for the rest of his life in
an institution for those with profound disability. Joshua's mother
brought a lawsuit against Winnebago County, and she said, "You
had an affirmative duty to protect Joshua, particularly because
you knew his father was abusing him and you did nothing. You
kept sending him back. You didn't follow up. You didn't do any-
thing to remove him from the home. You essentially turned a
blind eye. And because you knew, and because he was already in
the system, you should have protected him." The legal theory in
that case, for the lawyers in the room, was that the state had de-
prived Joshua of his liberty interest in bodily integrity, in viola-
tion of his rights under the substantive component of the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, by failing to intervene
to protect him against his father's violence.
The Court, in a 6-3 decision,14 rejected that argument holding
that it would have been one thing if Joshua was actually in a state
facility. That would have created a special relationship if he was
actually under state control. But the state otherwise has no af-
firmative duty to provide members of the general public with ade-
quate protection from harm imposed by others. In other words,
Joshua had no right-none of us has any right-to have the state
14. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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protect us from the violence of private actors. If the State of Wis-
consin wants to impose a secondary law that holds itself liable, it
is certainly free to do that. But from the concept of rights and lib-
erties that emanate from the Constitution, Joshua has no right to
be protected by his state.
Now, Justice Blackmun is most famous for two things: one is
authoring Roe v. Wade, 5 and a second is his dissent in DeShaney.
Bill Clinton, by the way, read it at his funeral, so I thought I
would share it with you as well. Justice Blackmun wrote:
Poor Joshua! Victim of repeated attacks by an irresponsible,
bullying, cowardly, and intemperate father, and abandoned
by respondents who placed him in a dangerous predicament
and who knew or learned what was going on, and yet did es-
sentially nothing except, as the Court revealingly observes,
"dutifully recorded these incidents in [their] files." It is a sad
commentary upon American life, and constitutional princi-
ples-so full of late of patriotic fervor and proud proclama-
tions about "liberty and justice for all," that this child, Joshua
DeShaney, now is assigned to live out the remainder of his life
profoundly retarded."
We have very different, contrasting views about what the affirma-
tive state duty is. By a margin of just two votes, the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence set off on the path away from affirmative
state duties, away from the obligations of the state, and toward
the continued privatization of violence.
That's not to say that the entire Supreme Court history on vio-
lence against women has been one of loss. And so let me talk
briefly about vindication. I couldn't help but do this because I'm
in Pennsylvania and, you know, there are many special things
about Pennsylvania. This is the birthplace of Planned Parenthood
v. Casey," and it is also the first state that had a statewide domes-
tic violence coalition. I don't know if you know that, but Pennsyl-
vania was the first state that had a statewide coalition, which, I
think, actually plays very importantly into this decision.
15. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
16. Id. at 213 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted).
17. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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E. Planned Parenthood v. Casey: Vindication
I like to collect cartoons about the Supreme Court. This one
says, "Senate Judiciary Committee hearing"; and that's Senator
Dianne Feinstein. This is during Judge Alito's confirmation hear-
ings and she says, "Judge Alito, I need to ask you some questions
about your views on women's rights." And Justice Alito responds,
"Do you have your husband's permission to do that?" Now, why is
that funny? Or not funny, but why do we laugh? Because Penn-
sylvania had passed a law regulating abortion in 1992, so this case
went up to the Court in 1992, just a few years before the Violence
Against Women Act passed. This was part of the reaction to Roe
v. Wade and an attempt on the part of the states to limit abortion
rights. And so one of the provisions in Pennsylvania's law was
that in order for married women to have an abortion, they had to
notify their husbands, which essentially acted as a permission.
One of the things I think is interesting about Pennsylvania and its
history is that one of the arguments against that provision was
created by the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic Violence,
and the argument they submitted in an amicus brief was that the
notification requirement would harm women who are in abusive
relationships because of the risks involved in notifying their hus-
bands.
This is the first time, by the way, that I can document that the
Supreme Court actually acknowledged not only the existence of
domestic violence, but also its impact on broader public policy. So
it was very significant. Now, of course, because it was Pennsylva-
nia, that case came out of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals,
where Judge Alito was serving at the time, and he upheld the no-
tification provision despite the arguments to the contrary. That's
just a little Supreme Court "back history."
In the plurality opinion, the Court acknowledged there are mil-
lions of women in this country who are victims of physical and
psychological abuse at the hands of their husbands. Should these
women become pregnant, they may have very good reasons for not
wishing to inform their husbands of their decision to obtain an
abortion. That's now the law. The Supreme Court has said that
because that provision can affect significant numbers of women
who are victims of gendered violence, you cannot require the noti-
fication provision. This opinion is notable because it suggests that
she is not to be blamed and that the state bears some responsibil-
ity when it crafts laws and policies, to take into account the reality
of gender violence. Yet, Planned Parenthood v. Casey is one of the
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few instances of true vindication, I believe, in Supreme Court ju-
risprudence.
F. Christy Brozankala: Loss
So let me tell you a few more stories of loss, including a story
about one of the provisions in the Violence Against Women Act
when it was originally passed. The Violence Against Women Act,
as you know, does many, many things. It is primarily a funding
statute. It provides money for organizations and states to engage
in different kinds of strategies to curb violence against women,
including many grants for coordinated community responses. It
does provide for some other kinds of federal regulation. In the
original bill was what was called a "civil rights remedy," similar to
civil rights remedies that are commonplace in the context of dis-
crimination on the basis of race. This was about a civil rights
remedy on the basis of gender. What it said is that, if I am victim-
ized by somebody who is motivated by gender bias, I can take my
case directly to federal court, and I can do so because we know
that the states have turned a blind eye to crimes like domestic
violence and sexual assault. The states have allowed violence
against women to occur, and so you can think about this as paral-
lel to civil rights in the racial context. Because the states have
done nothing, the federal government is now going to step in and
ensure that victims have a legal remedy for the violence. They
can sue their assailants in federal court.
Christy Brzonkala was a student at Virginia Polytechnic Insti-
tute, a state university. In her freshman year, she was sexually
assaulted and raped by two students who were varsity football
players. She reported the rapes and the university held discipli-
nary proceedings. The students admitted to having sexually as-
saulted her. One was temporarily suspended but then the univer-
sity reversed that punishment. Nothing happened to the other
student, and Christy eventually dropped out of school, and sued
her assailants and the school under the Violence Against Women
Act. The United States joined her in the lawsuit against the state,
so it became a federal case."s
The United States Supreme Court struck down the civil rights
provision of the Violence Against Women Act on two theories.
First was that Congress lacked the authority to enact the provi-
18. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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sion under the Commerce Clause because there was not regulate
activity that sustainably affected interstate commerce. The Court
reasoned that if you make this a federal crime, everything be-
comes a federal crime. The Court essentially said, "Don't make a
federal issue out of violence against women." When I teach this
case, my students don't even realize that it has anything to do
with violence against women. They think it all has to do with
congressional power and when the federal government can regu-
late noneconomic behavior. I find this notable because the issue of
violence is deeply obscured by the Court's discussion of federalism.
The inability of Christy to seek vindication against her assailants
is loss.
The second theory was that Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment authorizes Congress to enforce legislation to guaran-
tee that no State shall deprive any person life, liberty, property, or
equal protection of the law. But the Court again said that the fed-
eral government cannot regulate private actors. It can only regu-
late states. Because it was two private individuals who raped
Christy Brzonkala, there's no duty; there's no way the state can
get involved here, because this is about two people and not about
any affirmative government duty. This is loss. Not just a loss in
court, but the loss of Christy Brzonkala's ability to have her own
integrity, to pursue her profession and her passions. There's no
way for her to remedy the wrong that is done to her. The Court
won't do anything. The school won't do anything, and she has no
ability to go to the federal government for her remedy. She has no
way to enforce her integrity, her personhood. This case was in
2000 and it was a big defeat. This is the biggest blow to the Vio-
lence Against Women Act because absent that federal remedy
women often have nowhere else to go.
G. Castlerock v. Gonzales: Loss
That leads us to Castle Rock v. Gonzales." Jessica Gonzales,
now Jessica Lenahan, was married to a man named Simon Gonza-
les, who had serious mental health issues and serious issues
around being psychologically abusive to her and their three girls.
As part of her splitting up with Simon, Jessica got a restraining
order, which many of us are familiar with, and Colorado requires
the state to enforce restraining orders. It says you must arrest.
19. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
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The order allows Simon to have some very limited visitation with
the three girls at very defined times. The girls are outside playing
one afternoon. They don't come in. Jessica realizes that Simon
has kidnapped them. He actually kidnapped a friend, too, and
then let the friend go. That's always a part of the story that peo-
ple don't hear about.
Jessica Gonzales begins calling the Castle Rock Police station,
saying, "My husband has taken the girls. You need to go get him.
I have a restraining order. This is not part of the visitation. I'm
very concerned." She called seven times to the police station and
visited twice, each time saying, "I'm concerned for their safety."
She had heard from Simon. He had taken them to an amusement
park. She said, "Go get them." And the Castle Rock Police's re-
sponse, by and large, was, "Look, they're with their father, what
could be safer?"-despite the restraining order. And they said,
"Look, he'll bring them back. Don't worry. This is a private family
dispute, not one which, as the state, we're going to be involved in."
Around three o'clock in the morning, Simon Gonzales showed up
at the Castle Rock Police Department and began opening fire with
the gun he had bought earlier that day. The police returned fire,
and Simon Gonzales was killed. When they looked in the truck,
the three girls were dead inside. Originally, the police had said
that the girls were killed by their father earlier that evening, alt-
hough that evidence is inconclusive, and we don't know whether,
when the police returned fire, they were the ones who killed the
girls.
Jessica Gonzales sued the Castle Rock Police Department, and
she did so under two theories. One was the theory from Joshua
DeShaney's case, which is, "I have a right to be free from violence,
and you had a duty to protect me under my liberty interest." But
creative lawyers knew that that was not likely to fly because of
DeShaney, so they came up with a much more novel theory. That
novel theory was that she had a property interest in that restrain-
ing order. If the state was going to take that away, if the police
weren't going to enforce it, they had to tell her that so she could
have made other arrangements in her life. Because she relied on
that property interest, if they were not going to do what they said
they were going to do, she needed to be told that.
The Supreme Court ultimately disagreed with her. It said that,
essentially, a restraining order was just a piece of paper. Even
though the word "must" was on the restraining order, the Court
said that there's no constitutional right to be protected from pri-
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vate violence and no constitutional right to have the state order
enforced.
Advocates working in the field of domestic violence know that
the restraining order is often the first step toward a woman's safe-
ty. If there's no ability to have it enforced, it then really does just
become a piece of paper, and we are all left to our own devices to
protect ourselves. That is where this case could have ended. It
could have ended in loss, if not for so many wonderful advocates,
including a woman named Carrie Bettinger-Lopez, who is a facul-
ty member now at the University of Miami. She and her law stu-
dents got together and they said, "There must be a way to remedy
this. This is so bad. This is so wrong. There must be a way to
vindicate the loss." And so they brought the case to the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights.
H. International Human Rights Cases: Vindication
But before I get to that, let me talk about a couple of cases that
happened in the interim. As Jessica Gonzales's case is now being
reframed by lawyers and law students as an international human
rights case, other cases around the world are tracking a similar
path. There were two cases that happened between Jessica Gon-
zales's case at the Supreme Court and the ultimate decision in
that case that I just want to briefly share with you. One is called
the Cotton Field Case20 and one is Opuz v. Turkey.21
Let me start with the Cotton Field Case. In Juarez, Mexico, for
over fifteen years, significant numbers of women and girls had
either disappeared or been murdered-literally hundreds of them.
Juarez, Mexico is just over the Texas border, and the State of
Mexico did nothing to stop it. Hundreds of women and girls. Fi-
nally, advocates brought a case to the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights. Mexico, as well as many North and South Ameri-
can countries, are signatories to an international treaty22 that
provides that states have an affirmative duty to provide for the
life of their citizens and an affirmative duty to end gender-based
discrimination.
20. GonzAlez v. Mexico (Cotton Field), Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205 (Nov. 16, 2009), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec 205 ing.pdf.
21. Opuz v. Turkey, - Eur. Ct. H.R. _, App. No. 33401/02 (2009), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-92945#"itemid":["001-92945"]}.
22. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36.
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In that case, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights said
that Mexico was in violation of its treaty obligations. It was in
violation of international human rights law for failure to investi-
gate, for failure to intervene, and for failure to have policies that
were geared toward protecting women and girls. This was critical
because international human rights tribunals were starting to
say, "The state has to do something. It just can't simply turn a
blind eye when you have so many women and girls being victim-
ized by gender-motivated violence."
At just about at the same time, interestingly enough, there was
a case involving Turkey at the European Court of Human Rights.2 3
The United States is not a signatory to the European Declaration
of Human Rights, which is a compact among the European nations
proclaiming their own human rights obligations. The case in-
volved Nadia Opuz. She was in a very abusive relationship. Her
husband not only beat her and her children, but also her mother.
And she had gone to the police many times seeking remedy.
Sometimes they tried to prosecute him, but sometimes Nadia did
not go forward with the case.
Sometimes she would seek state help; sometimes she wouldn't.
Eventually, he killed her mother, for which he was sentenced to
two years, when Nadia was attempting to leave him. He beat Na-
dia extremely badly. So victims' rights advocates brought her case
to the European Court of Human Rights, saying that Turkey also
had an affirmative duty to protect her. What Turkey said, which I
thought was very interesting, was that, "Well, she didn't want our
help sometimes. So, if she doesn't want our help, there is nothing
we can do about that." To which the Court responded, "The reason
she doesn't want your help is because your justice system is so
screwed up. It doesn't respond to the victims of gender violence."
The husband only got two years. The legal system is set up to
condone, and in some ways even to invite, violence against women
and girls. Therefore, you, the State, have failed in your affirma-
tive duty to protect this woman and her family. And therefore,
you, State, are responsible for this.
L Jessica (Gonzales) Lenaham: Vindication
Those two cases came out at the same time Jessica Gonzales, by
then remarried and using the name of Jessica Lenaham, brought
23. Opuz v. Turkey, _ Eur. Ct. H.R. _, App. No. 33401/02 (2009).
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her case against Castle Rock to the Inter-American Human Rights
Commission. It was a long, long road. Jessica never even got to
testify because everything was decided on motions in the Ameri-
can system. So the first time she actually gets to tell her story is
to the Commission. The United States is not a signatory to many
human rights documents, but it is a signatory to the American
Declaration 24 and while the Commission doesn't really have en-
forcement power, it does have the power of persuasion. The
Commission concludes that even though the state recognizes the
necessity to protect Jessica, and her daughters Leslie, Katheryn,
and Rebecca Gonzales from domestic violence, it failed to meet
this duty with due diligence. The state apparatus was not duly
organized, coordinated, and ready to protect these victims from
domestic violence by adequately and effectively implementing the
restraining order issued. This failure to protect constituted a form
of discrimination in violation of Article Two of the Declaration.
And that discrimination was gender discrimination. It's a failure
to protect Jessica and her children. It's not about a private family
matter or Simon having mental illness that should be treated pri-
vately. This was really about fundamental, structural gender dis-
crimination that was embodied in the state's failure to act with
due diligence and to do the right thing on behalf of the victims.
J. Beyond Vindication and Loss to a New Human Rights Para-
digm
When we think about human rights, we often think about it be-
ing a problem in other countries, that human rights are some-
where across our borders, and that in the United States, we don't
have human rights problems. This is the first time an interna-
tional court has in essence said, "You know what, United States
Supreme Court? You know what, United States government? You
are now in violation of the human rights of your own citizen be-
cause you have failed to protect them from gendered violence."
The Inter-American Commission ultimately suggested that we
reimagine the future of VAWA within the context of broader hu-
24. American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, INTER-AMERICAN
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (Apr. 1948),
httpJ/www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic2.american%2ODeclaration.htm. Although
the declaration is not a legally binding treaty, the jurisprudence of both the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights holds it to
be a source of binding international obligations for the OAS's member states.
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man rights principles. Indeed, the Special Rapporteur on Violence
Against Women of the United Nations, concluded, at the close of a
recent visit to the United States, that:
Although Violence Against Women Act's intentions are lauda-
ble there is little in terms of actual legally binding federal
provisions which provide substantive protection or prevention
for acts of domestic violence against women. The challenge
has been further exacerbated by jurisprudence emanating
from the [United States] Supreme Court. The effect of such
cases as DeShaney, Morrison and Castle Rock is that even
where local and state police are grossly negligent in their du-
ties to protect women's right to physical security, and even
where they fail to respond to an urgent call for assistance
from victims of domestic violence, there is no constitutional or
statutory remedy at the federal level.25
This should give us pause. Twenty years after the Violence
Against Women Act, we still have failed to provide victims federal
remedy for gendered violence. We have failed to insist that we
impose upon ourselves, as a nation, the duty to protect women and
girls from gendered violence. So with every challenge, there is
now an opportunity to continue to do so. The next task is to come
up with creative, thoughtful ways in which we can institutionalize
the idea of affirmative state duties, both at the local level and at
the federal level, beyond what the Supreme Court has limited our
ability to do.
For those who work in this field, it's hard work. There are at-
torneys who take domestic violence cases and the people who work
in shelters, and the people who are on the front lines every day.
It's difficult work. You don't get the recognition that is well-
deserved. So now when people ask what kind of work I do, what
does my scholarship involve, I've stopped saying I do women's
rights or violence against women, and I just say, "I'm a human
rights worker. I work in human rights in the United States."
That connects each person who's working on issues of gendered
violence to a much broader international community of people.
25. Press Release, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Special Rappor-
teur on Violence against Women Finalizes Fact Finding Mission to the United States of
America, U.N. Press Release (Feb. 8, 2011), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewslD=10715.
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This community is connected much more deeply to the human
rights movement than anything else.
We now have a significant number of international cases that
reframe domestic violence as a human rights issue. This opens up
tremendous opportunity for creative lawyering, for creative solu-
tions. Go back to that initial goal that Senator Biden, now Vice
President Biden announced at the passage of VAWA. He called on
our sense of moral outrage. And that moral outrage ought to be
directed at our own unwillingness to share responsibility, to vindi-
cate. It should be our moral responsibility to vindicate.

